Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 9

Issue 3

Article 4

12-1-1985

Marketable Pollution Permits: Their Values, Theory, and
Application
D. Fraser MacFayden

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
D. Fraser MacFayden, “Marketable Pollution Permits: Their Values, Theory, and Application” (1984-1985)
9:3 DLJ 724.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

D. Fraser MacFayden*

Marketable Pollution
Permits: Their Values,
Theory, and Application

I. Introduction
The Economic Council of Canada recently expressed interest
in exploring alternatives to the traditional command and control
model of pollution control. The marketable pollution permit
(MPP) scheme proposed by Dales is one such alternative.' This
idea will be examined to assess its potential for practical
application. I conclude that the MPP idea has little potential
for widespread application. It is not suited to replace the
command and control model. There is potential for the
supporting principles of the scheme to provide a useful adjunct
to current regulatory controls.
The issue will be discussed in three sections. The first section
will emphasize the value laden nature of the pollution control
debate. The values incorporated in basic micro-economic
analysis will be highlighted. I state my own views on what values
are appropriate. Specific attention will then be given to the
implicit values of an MPP scheme and cost benefit analysis.
I end the discussion with the conclusion that there is good reason
to be concerned about the values contained in these tools.
The second section examines the economic theory supporting
an MPP scheme. It lays out the traditional arguments for
rejecting the command and control model in favour of effluent
fees. Next the arguments favouring the MPP scheme over the
fees approach are examined. I conclude that MPP's have some
advantages over an effluent fees approach.
The final section deals with the United States' efforts to
capture the benefits of the economic theories in the field of
air pollution control. The practical problems of implementing
the theory are discussed. It is these problems that lead me to
the position that it is only feasible to use the supporting concepts
of the MPP scheme as an adjunct to current regulatory policies.
*The original version of this article was prepared in the context of a seminar
on environmental law taught by Professor Mils at Dalhousie University.
1. J. Dales, Pollution Property & Prices (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1968).
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IL A Value Laden Exercise
Economic arguments are often presented as value free. I think
this is clearly wrong. The purpose of this discussion will be
to explain why I have reached this conclusion. To this end
the basic assumptions of the standard perfect competition model
will be explicitly stated. The values incorporated in that model
will be explained and my own values will be stated. In light
of that the reader can draw his own conclusion on my comments
regarding cost benefit analysis and MPP schemes.
Briefly put, an MPP scheme prohibits any pollution unless
the polluter has a permit. These permits create the right to
emit a certain amount of specified pollutants for a particular
length of time. Each permit is limited to its geographically
defined market and they are transferable.
The basic model used in economic analysis is the perfect
competition model. Its chief attraction is its prediction that
wealth will be maximized in a perfect market. This is a
justification for free market policies. Some of the major
assumptions that the prediction of wealth maximization is based
on include: full employment of resources, costless transitions
of capital and labour, no seller or buyer is large enough to
influence the market by its own actions, perfect information,
no transactions costs and, that within each group of products
no one item is preferred to another.
The model assumes that all relevant effects are fully priced.
It also assumes that individual satisfaction is capable of being
measured by the willingness people have to pay for products;
that products can be traded off in relation to their price so
that a different mix can leave the individual just as satisfied.
Obviously these assumptions are not met in real life. No one
denies this. It is, however, important to keep them in mind
when assessing how a theory will translate into practice. The
values incorporated in this model are most evident in the
adoption of wealth maximization as a value free goal. First
of all it is based on the assumption of scarce resources (like
all economic theory). The excess of wants over resources could
just as easily be viewed as too many wants. Adopting the
assumption of scarce resources reflects the view that nature
should be shaped to man's desires rather than man shaping
his desires to accommodate nature. This value choice is
incorporated in all economic analysis.
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Second, as Kronman points out, it necessarily involves a
reference to other values. 2 As a goal it is inconsistent in that
where different courses lead to the same total wealth it will
not assist in the choice. It would support any of the choices
even if they were made on the basis of opposing values.
Thirdly, Kronman argues it favours those with the initial
entitlements by defining wealth maximization in terms of
willingness to pay. 3 Only those views backed up with money
count. No distinction is made between the importance of a
dollar to a millionaire and the importance of a dollar to a
starving person.
The perfect competition model extols the benefits of an
unregulated free market based on its definition of wealth and
the assumption of wealth maximization. These assumptions
incorporate a specific view of man. It defines society as the
sum of its individuals. Individual freedom, defined as an
4
absence of coercion, is sought to be maximized.
The view that individual freedom ought to be maximized
and the definition of freedom as the absence of coercion are
clearly value choices. Freedom could just as easily be defined
as the freedom to enjoy a clean environment. Such an approach
would yield very different results.
Society no longer adheres, if it ever did, to the
conceptualization of individualism just enunciated. This is
evidenced by the high degree of government regulation of the
market place. Such intervention is strongly resisted by
advocates, such as Nozick, of that view of individualism. 5 The
government's involvement in income redistribution is also
inconsistent with that conception of individualism as
6
demonstrated by philosophers such a Hayek.
I do not agree that the only points of view that count are
those backed up with money. Neither do I agree with the
approach to individualism that defines freeedom as the absence
2. A. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle (1980), 9
J. Legal Stud. 232.
3. Supra, note 2, at 240.
4. D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication (1976),
89 Harv. L. Rev. at 1728.
5. H. Hart, Between Utility and Rights (1979), 79 Colum. L. Rev. at 831.
6. F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1960) at 231.
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of coercion and seeks to maximize that ahead of all else. I
state my values explicitly because they colour my analysis and
my conclusions.
I believe that decisions as to what level of pollution control
we are to have are fundamental value choices. As such they
should remain political to emphasize their value laden nature.
A weighing of the relative merits of more economic growth
versus more environmental protection ought not to be
portrayed as anything less than the conflict they envisage.
I generally support more environmental protection and less
growth. This belief stems from the way I view the role of man
in the world. I find unsatisfactory those explanations of the
pollution problem which attempt to explain things in a very
narrow framework. I find Sagoff's attempt to develop a right
to environmental quality based on the Constitution of the
United States as unconvincing. 7 Likewise, Tribe's attempt to
explain pollution in terms of the development of immanence
and transcendence in western thought is too narrow. 8
Pollution is a world wide problem. It is not linked to specfic
ideologies. Both Sagoff and Tribe point to the fact that humans
are basically want oriented. They draw different conclusions
from this but it is, I feel, the central point in both their
arguments. It is the basis for the choice of the assumption of
scarce resources as opposed to the assumption of excessive
demand.
Each person, as a person has certain basic needs. These stem
from his very existence. One of these is a nontoxic environment.
This surely provides a sound basis to develop a right to a clean
environment.
Beyond this I think those who criticize our homocentric view
of the world are correct. Such a view assumes that without
us the world would have no meaning. It is this narrow view
that Sagoff criticizes when he attacks those who desire a clean
environment solely because it is beautiful. 9
Having stated my values as best I can, there is one more
point that needs emphasis before proceeding. The concept of
7. M. Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment (1974), 84 Yale L.

J. at 228.
8. L. Tribe, "Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees" in When Values
Conflict (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co. 1976) at 81.

9. Supra, note 7, at 223.
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preference shaping or means-ends fluidity is very important.
Economists assume preferences are independent of changes in
resource allocation. This is not the way the world operates.
What people expect is partly a function of what they have been
exposed to.
The idea of a clean environment is relative. It is based on
what we think is polluted. If we were exposed to different
pollution levels, then our concept of a clean environment would
change.
This is important because not only will the level of
environmental protection achieved today affect that demanded
in the future but the values expressed today will affect the values
developed in the future.
Means-ends fluidity causes both Sagoff and Tribe to reject
Stones idea of giving standing to natural objects.' 0 They
objected to the fact that it was more a precedural device to
give environmentalists standing rather than a real attempt to
break away from a want oriented approach. Rather than
attempting to encourage respect for nature as something
valuable in and of itself this approach forces nature to fit into
peoples conception of their wants. The problems of translating
values into such terms are discussed later in the context of
cost benefit analysis.
The purpose of examining these economic tools is to see if
they contain values that may shape the way people see things
which are inconsistent with the values one is attempting to
reinforce.
I have included cost benefit analysis in this discussion for
two main reasons: 1) the issues involved are important in
deciding between an MPP scheme and a fees approach; 2) as
a widely used policy tool it might be used to decide the
structures of an MPP scheme.
Before discussing how values influence these tools on a
theoretical level, a very brief mention will be made on how
they influence cost benefit analysis on a practical level. One
major unresolved issue is the extent to which future benefits
and costs ought to be discounted. Those who believe the market
does not provide adequately for the future argue for a lower
or zero discount rate.
10. G. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing: Towards Legal Rights For
NaturalObjects (1972), 45 S. Cal. Law Rev. at 450.
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Any discounting necessarily favours proposals putting costs
on future generations and benefits on the present generation.
Others feel the market adequately provides for the future and
no explicit adjustments needs to be made.
The problems of measuring costs and benefits cannot be
understated. This is especially true of what are called soft
variables or fragile values. These are things that are not
normally priced in the market such as the feeling of satisfaction
some people get knowing an unspoiled piece of wilderness exists
even though they may never see it. Sagoff strongly objects to
cost benefit analysis in dealing with these because the choice
of what values to count and how to measure them is subject
to so much variation that the results of the analysis have little
meaning. "
There is no market for these values so different survey
techniques are used. This is expensive and the answers people
give are not necessarily trustworthy. First, they may be
influenced by whether the person feels their answer will affect
their tax burden. Secondly, people have little experience pricing
these values so it is difficcult to tell how close they have come
to how they really feel. Attempting to avoid the problem by
having people rank things in order of priority does not work
because there is no one logical order deducible from the

results. 12
There are tremendous difficulties in measuring the costs of
pollution. The costs of gathering information not reflected in
the market are large. Predicting future damage is made more
difficult by nonlinear damage functions and interactions
between the pollutants.
It is easy to see there are many areas where judgement calls
must be made. These interject values into the analysis.
Marketable pollution permit schemes are subject to these same
I I. Supra, note 7, at 223.
12. Arrow demonstrated that unambiguous collective rankings do not
necessarily result from unambiguous individual ranking. Consider this
example of three different individual orderings: ABC
BCA
CAB
213 prefer A to B, 213 prefer B to C and though one expects 213 to prefer
A to C in fact 213 prefer C to A. K. Arrow, Social Choice to Individual
Values (2d).
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difficulties in deciding for instance what number of permits
to issue. Aside from these practical problems there are effects
that flow from the very act of using either cost benefit analysis
or an MPP scheme.
The use of these techniques assumes that people express the
same preferences in the market as they do as a collective body.
Sagoff argues that in fact people think about these things on
two different levels, a private level and a public level.' 3 If this
is so, any attempt to reflect the allocation a perfect market
would make would still not reflect what society as a collective
body might desire.
This argument directly addresses the assumption that
society's preferences may be revealed by the summation of
individual market decisions. To my mind it is plausible that
different answers result from the questions 'How much should
society spend for X?' and 'How much would you spend for
X?', assuming aside measurement problems. Whether there is
a social consciousness separate from the sum of individual
consciousnesses is, I think, a matter of legitimate debate.
A related argument is that people think of things that are
priced, differently than those that are not. The very act of
assigning a price to a previously unpriced value will change
the way people feel about it. Kelman calls this the
downvaluation effect. 14
Tribe describes this effect as stemming from a flattening of
an inchoate sense of obligation to another person or thing as
that person or thing into an expression of self interest measured
in dollars.' 5 He also points to a shortening of discontinuities
in that no amount of money could fully compensate for the
elimination of a species, so any attempt to measure it will
necessarily fall short.16
An example of this at work may be seen in the health care
field. Society allocates only a certain amount of money to
treatment and research. Using cost benefit analysis one would
conclude that society has decided the benefit of saving more
13. M. Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law (1981), 79 Mich.

L. Rev. at 1394.
14. S. Kelman, What Price Incentives (Boston: Auburn House Publishing
Co., 1981) at 59.
15. Supra, note 8, at 74.
16. Supra, note 15.
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lives by increasing expenditures is no longer worth the cost
of those expenditures. It could then quantify the value of a
human life and decide if the benefits of additional spending
were worth more in the national defence area, for example,
than the medical services area.
I think there is a difference between saying the value of a
life is $189,576.35 and saying the health budget will be increaed
by 6 percent, even if the spending of an additional $189,576.35
would save another life. I agree with Kelman that any attempt
to price all the values that go into a decision would decrease
the esteem with which we regard them.
Some might argue this is only a cowardly fiction. Such an
argument presupposes that there is some completely value-free
reference point to judge what is true and false. It also
presupposes fictions have no value. I disagree with both points.
This so called cowardly fiction allows one to make necessary
allocational decisions without attempting to price the value of
a human life. This preserves a belief in the sanctity of human
life, that has long found expression in society. At some point
this separation could mask hypocrisy because without a
meaningful commitment by society, how can it be said that
people really value life. This tension does not however, destroy
the usefulness of the fiction in the first place.
A market is based on the pursuit of self interest. Anything
that emulates or expands its application will foster an increased
amount of self interest. To the extent society values altruism
or spontaniety it should be careful about adopting tools that
incorporate antithetical values. The resulting decrease in
7
altruism is what Kelman calls the feeling fall off effect.1
In summary, I feel that cost benefit analysis and MPP
schemes contain values that conflict with the values supporting
a desire for increased environmental quality. The three main
reasons for this conclusion are: that people make different
judgements on a public as opposed to private level; that pricing
values leads to a decrease in their worth; and that these tools
foster the pursuit. of self interest in an area when that is not
appropriate.
Despite what I think to be convincing arguments to the
contrary, some people such as Tribe continue to assert there
17. Supra, note 14, at 56.
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is no theoretical reason why cost benefit analysis should not
be used in the environmental field ie. it's value free.' 8 Tribe
rejects the idea that ". . . values and ends are reducible to
logically arbitrary expressions of will or desire ... " because
it leaves him in a subjective position. 19
Tribe appears to identify a relativistic position with his
concept of transcendence, choice without principles, which
leads to dehumanization.2 0 Such drastic results do not
necessarily fall from the adoption of a subjective stance.
Nothing precludes one from adopting a set of values and acting
consistently with them. One can argue that they are the best,
just not that this is objectively verifiable. Based on the rest
of Tribe's position I must say I am not convinced that he has
fully thought through the argument, given his summary dismissal
2
of it in a footnote. '
The argument that cost benefit analysis can adjust for the
downvaluation effect completely misses the point. This assumes
that the adjustment plus the price (set in a market for instance)
are equal to the initial worth of the value. In other words,
the adjusted price now represents the true worth of the value.
The whole problem began however, with the assumption that
a price could not fully reflect the worth of a value and any
attempt to compensate by increasing the price will necessarily
fail for the same reason.
The affects of preference shaping make it important to
recognize the values contained in the tools used to pursue one's
goals. If, as I believe, cost benefit analysis and MPP schemes
contain values inconsistent with those I seek to reinforce by
the use of those tools there exists a fundamental conflict. For
example, if MPP's are used, the creation of this private property
'right' may well change the way pollution is viewed. For those
who object to pollution, the creation of a right to pollute would
not be attractive. I think this would be so even though the
MPP was designed according to collective input regarding
conflicting values.
While the adoption of these tools may encourage values
18. L. Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to ConstitutionalStructures:
Learning From Natures Future(1974), 84 Yale L. J. at 545.
19. Supra, note 18.

20. Supra, note 8, at 79.
2 1. Supra, note 18, at 551.
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inconsistent with the reason for their adoption, this alone is
not sufficient reason for outright rejection. If these tools are
more effective than alternatives in achieving desired goals, then
better results will be achieved with them. Results are important
because the environment that people expect is partly a function
of what they are exposed to. If rejection of these tools because
they contain values inconsistent with the objectives sought leads
to a failure to achieve the objectives and results in an erosion
of original values it becomes a classic 'dammed if you do,
dammed if you don't' situation.
I would be much more reluctant to adopt cost benefit analysis
than an MPP scheme. Cost benefit analysis is a decision making
tool whereas MPP's need some outside decision maker to
detrmine its structure (ie. determine the number of permits).
The impact of the downvaluation effect etc. is, I think, more
important in setting directions for society. The MPP allows
for collective input into the structuring decisions which do not
require all values to be priced.
I think it is best to make these decisions on a collective ie.
political level, as opposed to using cost benefit analysis and
shifting the focus to the administrative setting. There is a
conflict here in the desire to see nature valued as something
good per se to have environmental quality viewed as a
legitimate right, and the desire for majoritarian input. Even
with all the faults of current legislative structures, I would
rather have an open decision based on societal values than
perfunctory bureaucratic decisions.
Without wandering further I shall endeavor to succintly state
my conclusion. Cost benefit analysis and MPP schemes are
value laden tools. These values are inconsistent with values
promoting environmental quality. Cost benefit analysis poses
more cause for concern because it is a decision making tool
and the quantification process lends itself to administrative
rather than collective decision making.
III. The Economic Rationale of MPP's
Returning to the beginning of the paper it will be remembered
that one of the assumptions in micro economic theory (on
which all the efficiency arguments are based) is that everything
is priced. This assumption in turn is based on the concept of
a private good, one which you can exclude others from
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enjoying. The air and water are public goods. By and large
it is not practical to exclude others from their use. This poses
problems because each individual does not consider the costs
his use imposes on others.
The classic explanation of this problem in the context of
the fisheries, is that of Scott Gordon.2 2 His point is that this
nonexcludability characteristic creates an incentive to overutilize the resource. A fisherman would not regulate his catch
to provide for the future because he could not keep another
fisherman from catching the fish tomorrow that he did not
catch today. The only way to be sure to benefit from that fish
is to catch it today, even if the fisherman is well aware he
would be better served by not catching it if the fish could be
23
allowed to reproduce to replenish the stocks.
Air and water being common property resources are likewise
overutilized causing pollution. The standard economic response
was to advocate measures that would price the use of a common
property resource like air to reflect its true costs, so that the
polluter would no longer treat it as a free good. This would
create an incentive to use less of it. The increased price of the
goods would reflect the costs of using the common property
resource. Society would reallocate its spending in response to
the new signals to achieve an efficient resource allocation.
1 think it is important, before proceeding further, to examine
the fundamental challenge Coase put forward to this point of
view. 24 Coase argues that placing the cost of pollution on the
polluter will not, contrary to the standard assumption, result
in a change in behaviour of the polluter. He therefore contends
there is no a priori reason to assign the cost to the polluter.
If he is correct then the theoretical grounding of the MPP
scheme is very insecure because it is a derivation of the
mainstream economic arguments.

22. H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common Property
Resource: The Fishery" in Economics of the Environment (New York: W.

W. Norton & Co., 1977) at I ll.
23. With a private resource one would stop producing when the marginal
revenue of the last unit equalled the marginal cost. With a common property
resource production would continue past this point until average revenue
equalled average cost, thus dissipating the rent that could have been generated
on the intramarginal units.
24. R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost (1960), 3 J. of Law Econ. 1.
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The proposition that liability rules will not affect allocation
is counter-intuitive. It relies on the role of bribes. Standard
theory assumes that the common property user does not
consider the cost his use imposes on others. Coase argues that
he does consider these costs.
Given all the standard assumptions of economic theory Coase
argues that the person suffering damage would be willing to
pay the user an amount up to the damage caused if the user
would stop inflicting the damage. Any decision to increase the
size of the common property resource would include a
calculation of the bribe foregone at equilibrium. This amount
will be equal to the damage the user causes. As this is precisely
the amount that changing the liability rules to make the user
liable would place on the user, there will be no change in his
costs. His behaviour therefore will not change.
I think that Coase's model does not accurately represent the
situation. Even if one accepts his argument that different
liability rules will not affect long run resource allocation 25 there
are other reasons to suspect that his analysis will not yeild the
predicted results. He adopts the standard assumption that
preferences are independent of allocations. If this was true,
people would give the same answer to the question 'How much
would you pay to decrease pollution?' as they would to the
question 'How much would you need to be paid before you
would allow an increase in pollution?' (the increase and decrease
being equivalent).
This is not accurate for two main reasons. In the first place
the initial allocation of the assets will affect the income
distribution, hence the respective abilities to pay. Assigning the
asset to individuals would increase their income allowing them
to purchase more pollution control. In the second place, the
initial assignment of the rights to individuals would shape their
preferences in favour of more pollution control.
The presence of risk aversion in the populace would lead
them to different choices depending on the initial assignment.
25. G. Calabresi, "Transactions Costs, Resources, Allocation & Liability
Rules" in Economics of the Environment (New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
1977) at 253. For this result to hold true there would have to be perfect
price discrimination in a perfectly competitive market. It is not at all clear
why this unusual result would be obtained.
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There is evidence suggesting people view quite differently the
act of being exposed to a risk depending on whether they pay
to avoid it or are paid to encounter it.26 To the extent people
view pollution as risk creating this would clearly result in
different answers to those questions.
The existence of transactions costs and information costs
means that initial allocations will make a difference. In the
majority of cases it will lead to too much pollution. This results
from the fact that polluters are generally a smaller group than
pollutees. There are tremendous costs involved in trying to
organize diffuse interests (where each has suffered minor
damage). There are also large costs in trying to trace the cause
of pollution when there are multiple souces emitting similar
pollutants. These factors would cause an under-representation
of the diffuse interests due to their relatively higher costs of
organization.
In summary, I conclude there are very good reasons to believe
that changing the initial allocation of rights to internalize the
costs of pollution on the polluter will result in a different
allocation of resources. I have spent so much time on this point
because it is fundamental to the economic theory that follows
that firms will alter their behaviour in response to a change
in the cost of polluting.
Economists generally recommend cost internalization
measures over the command and control model of direct
regulation, or subsidization. The usual form is an effluent fees
proposal whereby a price for each unit of pollution discharged
is levied against the polluter. The polluter then chooses how
much pollution he will discharge.
Regulation is rejected by economists mainly because of the
costs it entails. Across the board regulations make no allowance
among firms for the fact that some firms may cut back pollution
much more cheaply than others. A fees system accounts for
these costs by leaving the decision to the firm as to whether
it would be cheaper to abate than pay the fee. Advocates of
fees claim that the resulting reallocation of abatement effort
could achieve the same level of pollution control at substantial
cost savings.
26. M. Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and Ideology in

the Coase Theorem (1979), 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 682.
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Economists admit that it would theoretically be possible to
reach the same result if regulations were tailored to each
individual firm's costs. The cost of obtaining estimates of the
relevant cost functions and of administering the complex
27
regulations are generally accepted to preclude this option.
Another argument is that regulations only provide incentives
to meet a standard. Effluent fees provide incentives for a
continued effort to cut back because the polluter pays for every
unit discharged.
Subsidization is another form of handling pollution control
that is generally rejected in favour of fees. Capital write-off
provisions in Canada allow a deduction for taxes of 50 percent
of the undepreciated capital cost of investment in pollution
control. 28 The problem is that it still costs the firms something
and they earn no money on pollution control investment. This
lack of incentive to decrease pollution has led to this scheme's
rejection by economists.

29

It would be possible to structure subsidies based on the
amount of pollution cut back. This would be the mirror of
an effluent fees approach. It would create real incentives for
firms to abate. The problem is that there is no natural level
for the subsidy as it is based on a calculation of foregone
production. Presumably it would be paid to those that closed
down and decreased emissions to zero and those that would
have started up but for the subsidy. It would be an
administrative nightmare.
Dales followed the standard line of analysis to this point
but rejects the effluent fee approach in favour of his MPP
scheme. The MPP scheme is designed to attempt to correct
some of the problems encountered with effluent fees. One of
the main problems it was to solve was the difficulty in setting
the fee at the correct level.
The argument for fees flowing from standard analysis is that
by setting the fee equal to the damage caused by the pollution
the market would yield an efficient result. The cost of pollution
27. Supra, note 1, at 86.
28. Strikeman, Income Tax Act (annotated) Richard DeBoo Publishers
(Toronto: 1968).
29. Seneca, Tausig, Environmental Economics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, 1979) at 239.
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would be treated like any other cost the firm encountered. This
is called the damage cost pricing approach.
This approach would require a large administrative agency
because it would be necessary to set different fees for different
sources because not every unit of pollution does the same
damage. Even the most ardent advocate of a fees approach
compromises here to some form of across the board fee
structure. Clearly at some point the extra administrative costs
are not justified by the minimal efficiency gains. Yet even with
the compromise the measurement problem remains.
The time of the year affects the ability of the environment
to assimilate pollution and would presumably have to be
accounted for. Tracing the damage to one source in a multi
source area could prove impossible. The presence of thresholds
complicate things. If no damage is caused until X is exceeded,
is it only the X + I unit that causes the damage or is there
some other allocation? The same problem occurs when two
or more chemicals react to form a harmful substance. How
is the damage to be allocated amongst them? These are just
some of the problems that exist in measuring the physical
effects.
The physical effects are most likely easier to measure than
the damage to such things as asthetics. Attempting to measure
these soft variables get into all the problems mentioned earlier
dealing with pricing values in cost benefit analysis. These
problems essentially reduce the process to a blatantly arbitrary
exercise.
This has led to the adoption of result oriented pricing. The
claim to efficiency is abandoned. In its place is the argument
of cost effectiveness. This was the argument I used in initially
describing the fee approach because it is the most common
way it is presented. As previously stated, no firm would abate
if it was less expensive to pay the fee. The result is that those
firms that can abate the most cheaply cut back the most,
resulting in savings to society. Marketable pollution permits
rely on this same idea. The polluter is left with the choice of
abating or buying another pollution permit on the market. The
permit price has the same effect as the fee.
An argument for the superiority of an MPP scheme is that
it provides more certainty as to pollution levels with less
information. All that is necessary is to decide how much

Marketable Polution Permits 739

pollution is permissable and set the number of permits at that
level.
This argument assumes quantity is the most important
consideration. Both schemes can achieve the same results. A
fee approach requires more information about firms'
production functions to estimate the result of different fees but
gives more certainty as to the price effects. Depending on
whether the cost or the amount of pollution is more important,
one would be preferred to the other. This preference could
change for different pollutants ie; society may be more
concerned with costs where only asthetics as opposed to health
concerns are involved.
Marketable pollution permits do not necessarily create more
certainty for investors. It is argued that fees would have to
be experimented with at first, due to imperfect information,
in order to determine what response the polluters will make
to different fees. The MPP has its own source of uncertainty.
The MPP's are set for a fixed time. The choice of this time
period is very important. If it is too short then there will be
very little certainty in the market because the authorities can
always decide to change the number of new permits it will issue
once the old ones have expired. It would be difficult if not
impossible to predict the cost of pollution permits in the future
if they were subjects to frequent arbitrary supply changes. The
willingness of industry to commit itself to large long term
commitments of money in pollution control in that atmosphere
of uncertainty is unclear.
If the time period is lengthened to create a stable investment
environment it will decrease governments ability to respond
to new information. How this balance between the desirability
of certainty for investment decision making and the desire to
preserve the ability to respond to new information should be
struck is a difficult question to which I have no satisfactory
answer.
Dales correctly points out that it will be necessary for the
authorities not to change the number of permits before the
old ones expire. 30 If new permits are issued midstream in
response to industry pressure then the whole pricing mechanism
will be thrown into confusion. The price is set on the
30. Supra, note 1, at 95.
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assumption of a fixed number of permits. Any increase in the
number of permits would dilute the value of the original
permits.
In summary, the attractiveness of the certainty arguments
rests on the assumptions that: the quantity of pollution is more
important than price; the time period of the permits is long
enough to provide a suitable investment climate; and the
authorities do not bow to pressure to change the number of
permits prematurely.
Another argument for MPP's is that it automatically
accounts for inflation whereas fees would have to be continually
re-adjusted. This is correct but does not necessarily mean that
the fees would not keep up with inflation.
A fees scheme is said not to deal with the problem of entry
into the market. As long as a firm pays the fee it can enter.
With MPP's the entry is accounted for by the fact that the
increased demand for the permits automatically increases the
price. This is true as far as it goes but what is to prevent the
authorities from increasing the fee to account for growth. In
the same vein it is possible that the government could decide
to issue more permits when they are up for renewal if it is
felt the limited supply has created an overly high price that
has unduly inhibited growth.
Some argue a permit system would be at least partially self
enforcing. I doubt there will be any significant effect here
because of the necessity to monitor emissions to detect
violations. While individual permit holders have an interest in
seeing the rules obeyed so the value of their permits do not
get diluted, they do not have the resources or power to monitor
all the other participants in the market. For this reason I feel
enforcement will be primarily a public responsibility.
In the end the choice between a fees versus an MPP approach
largely rests on whether you are more concerned with levels
of pollution or costs of pollution abatement as the other
arguments for and against lend little to either side. I would
adopt the MPP proposal because it accomplishes directly what
the result oriented fees approach attacks only indirectly. Only
if the cost of pollution control was clearly the overriding
concern would I adopt a fees approach.
A couple of final points on this area. Both MPP's and fees
are only practical for point source emissions of pollution. Dales
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clearly recognized that the monitoring problems with non-point
3
source discharges would be insurmountable. 1
Both these models are talked of in the context of classical
air and water pollution. A fair amount is known about these
areas. This knowledge allows informed decision making in
setting up the parameters. No such knowledge is available in
the environmental risk type pollutants (ie. heavy metals, new
durgs, cancer causing agents). If as Gelpe and Tarlock feel these
will be of increasing importance in the future, 32 these models
will have a decreasing chance of applicability. With the level
of obselescence of knowledge in that area as well as the general
uncertainty, all the problems discussed in determining the life
of an MPP would be exacerbated across the board.
IV. The PracticalApplication of Theory
The theoretical arguments of economists have not been very
influential in the past. The Economic Council of Canada's
recent expression of interest in this area may foreshadow
changes in Canada. 33 In the United States some efforts have
been made to accomodate the economic cost effectiveness
arguments in air pollution regulation.
The 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA) set pollution targets based
on health not economic criteria, secondary targets of general
welfare protection (ie. aesthetics) included cost considerations.
The potential cost of meeting these goals became so great that
by the mid 1970's it was recognized that cheaper ways of
attaining pollution control goals had to be found. 34 Offsets,
bubbles and banking were created in response to this pressure. 35
The offset was designed to allow development in areas where
the pollution levels would have precluded new development
under the original legislation. If the new emission source could
find an existing comparable source or sources and obtain a
reduction from them greater than the new source's planned
3 1. Supra, note 1, at 98.
32. Gelpe, Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental
Decision Making (1974), S. Cal. L. Rev. at 371.
33. Supra, note 2.
34. J. Lanclair, Who Owns the Air? The Emission Offset Concept and Its
Implications (1979), 9 Envt'l L. at 578.
35. J. Gonzales, Markets in Air: Problems and Prospects of Controlled
Trading(1981), 5 Harv. Envt'l L. Rev. at 377.
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additions then it would be allowed to proceed.3 6 Reasonable
further progress toward the air quality goal was made and
growth was accomodated. The offsets can be more easily
generated by sources which can abate more cheaply. Offsets
thus create incentives to allocate abatement efforts to the most
cost effective source.
The bubble concept treats emissions from several sources as
emissions from one source. A firm can cut back different
amounts at the different sources so long as the total emissions
from all sources is acceptable. Obviously, a firm would abate
the most at the cheapest source. This saves money when
compared to across the board reductions previously enforced
in the regulations.
Banking is an extension of the offset concept. Originally the
decrease from the existing source had to be substantially
37
contemporaneous with the increase from the new source.
Banking allows firms a credit, which may be saved when they
reduce their pollution level more than they are required. It can
later be traded to another firm or kept for the firm's own use.
It should allow for more active offset trading.
Needless to say, these programs have not been trouble free.
The practical problems of implementing an MPP scheme are
very large. Some of these problems will now be discussed with
reference, where appropriate, to the problems experienced in
the United States. Another of the main areas of concern in
an MPP scheme is the accurate monitoring of pollution to
ensure the permits are being complied with. The problem is
more acute for an MPP scheme than in the normal command
and control model.
Under the CAA technology forcing is the method used to
move towards pollution goals. This requires that inspectors
check facilities to see if they have the appropriate equipment
in place and working (not a small task). Regulations limiting
discharge concentration only require sufficient periodic
monitoring to pose a reasonable threat of being caught. With
an MPP there has to be continuous monitoring to see if the
emission limit is being complied with. Just to measure stack
36. Id.
37. P. Reed, G. Wetstone (ed) Air and Water Pollution Control Law: 1982
(Washington: Environmental Law Institute, 1982) at 244.
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emissions there has to be measurements of flow, pressure,
38
temperature, and concentration at several points in the stack.
While continuous monitoring might not be necessary for
permits based on ambient air quality, these permits have a
number of other problems which will be discussed later.
A major problem with any MPP scheme is the market and
permit design. Without examining the banking regulations of
each state I could not say how this problem is dealt with in
the United States.
A permit may be based on the amount of pollutant emitted
or the effect the emision has on ambient air quality. The
ambient air quality approach is theoretically superior because
it measures the results of emissions, which is what we are
concerned with. It is generally rejected as impractical because
of the extra cost involved. 39 It would necessitate firms holding
several different permits based on the ambient effects at various
locations and complex modelling to determine the impact on
air quality of each firm's emissions.
The problems of undifferentiated quantity permits is that
they would permit a concentration of polluters in one area.
This may be alright where the pollutants have few localized
effects (ie. chlorofluorocarbons) but for any pollutant that has
localized effects it would allow pollution levels to grow to a
hazardous level.
To the extent the existing market contains regions that are
relatively clean it would be desirable to prevent them from
becoming as polluted as elsewhere. This assumes a value
decision has been made in favour of environmental protection.
The concentration problem poses health concerns; the
diffusion problem, softer value concerns. Both these suggest
a need for geographic differentiation in the permit to influence
where polluters emit. That is to say the permit would have
varying values depending on where it was to be used. This
necessarily complicates the market structure and increases
costs. Noll's analysis suggests that there is very little to be
gained from geographic resolution. 40 He considers only
38. Supra, note 35, at 389.
39. Noll, "The Feasibility of Marketable Emission Permits in the United
States" in Public Sector Economics (Toronto: McMillan, 1983).
40. Supra, note 37, at 256.
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abatement costs in his analysis. 4' He also assumes an even
starting distribution 4 2 of pollution thereby not considering the
possible health consequences where economies of scale leads
to concentrations of polluters. He factored out the very
considerations in favour of a geographically differentiated
permit. It is, therefore, not surprising he reached the result he
did.
A possible way to avoid the complexities of geographically
differentiated permits would be to set the market boundaries
in such a way to form regions of relatively equal air quality.
An undifferentiated permit would not affect location decisions
by polluters. There would be no reason to expect a diffusion
or concentration of pollutants. The problem is this may create
so many small markets as to make the administrative costs
prohibitive. Small size could also stifle the viability of a market
by limiting the number of participants which in turn may affect
the level of transactions.
The concern over market size is very real. There must be
enough trading to create a regular price for a permit and give
people confidence that they will be able to buy in the future
if they sell today (otherwise they may not sell today). Without
an established price the MPP scheme will be of more limited
effect. Firms will still reallocate pollution abatement effort to
the least cost source within the firm but will not have a ready
measure to compare themselves to other firms. The result is
it will be difficult for a firm to tell if it should cut back more
and try to sell the extra permits or cut back less and buy more.
The problem is that without confidence in the market polluters
will be unwilling to sell off permits but until people start selling
and buying in numbers the market will be too sparse to inspire
44
confidence, a catch 22 situation.
The number of participants is important to establish this level
of transactions. An established price will allow a ready
calculation of the cost of holding a permit versus abatement.
If the number of participants is too small the price may be
fixed or some of the larger firms may try to squeeze out their
competitors by cornering the permit market. In Los Angelus
41. Supra, note 39.
42. Supra, note 37, at 258.
43. Supra, note 39.
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for example 10 companies emit 85 percent of the sulfur oxides. 43
The banking set up in the States only credits amounts by which
companies decrease emissions more than required. It would not,
therefore, be possible to force competitors out of business by
cornering the market.
Large transactions costs will also inhibit the number of
trades. The development of banking was partly a response to
the large transactions costs involved in trading offsets. It was
difficult to find suppliers so most of the trades occurred within
the same firm. 45 Large transactions costs have also sparked the
46
approval of a streamlined procedure for obtaining a bubble.
Prior to this the costs only made it worthwhile in a few large
applications (18 were approved with average savings of
47
$2,000,000 each).
Obviously not all types of emissions are equally serious. The
definition of the categories of permissable trades will also affect
the viability of the markets. A wide definition provides more
participants but allows the possible substitution of more
harmful for less harmful pollutants. The EPA currently restricts
trades to within each of the criteria pollutant groups they
monitor (ie. sulphur oxides) with the condition that the more
48
harmful ones are not substituted for less harmful ones.
The decision on how to allocate the permits is probably
politically the most thorny, and therefore practically the most
important problem is setting up an MPP scheme. The permits
might be auctioned off or distributed free to present polluters.
This discussion shall concentrate on the broader debate as to
whether the permits should be sold or given away, not on how
each goal would be carried out.
The banking provisions in the United States have been
44. Note A Remedy for the Victims of Pollution Permit Markets (1983),
92 Yale L. J. at 1022 discusses the difficulties in remedying the structural
deficiencies of the market. It concludes that the best course is to create a
cause of action to allow those injured by high localized pollution levels to
be compensated by the government. This conclusion implicitly accepts that
the scheme is of itself worthwhile.
45. Supra, note 37, at 255.
46. E. Saideman, An Overview of the Bubble Concept (1983), Colum. J.

of Envt'l L., at 157 describes the pressures leading up to a streamlining of
the process designed to decrease the costs of getting approval for a bubble.
47. Supra, note 39.
48. Id.
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harshly criticized for what is perceived to be a giving away
to industry of property in the air.49 Economists generally pay
little attention to this allocation problem. If the concern is
environmental quality then people decide on what level of
protection they want, that number of permits is issued and that
level of protection is obtained. Allocation will not affect the
result.
It is also argued that in general equilibrium it makes little
difference how they are allocated. If industry pays, consumers
pay higher prices but get lower taxes (government revenue
increases). If industry gets them free both taxes and prices are
the same. However, the two groups, taxpayers and consumers
are not identical groups. Evidence suggests the net benefits are
allocated regressively if industry pays. 50 Economists generally
separate the distributional impacts of their proposals arguing
that these side affects are best dealt with directly. Given the
scarcity of such direct dealing I think that such impacts must
be considered and weighed with other competing interests when
the decision is made.
Even assuming that each person would be in exactly the same
dollar position under either allocation (equal incomes, identical
consumption, same taxes) I think there are legitimate reasons
for distinguishing between the two allocations. One argument
rests on the previously discussed idea that people weigh things
differently in their public role as opposed to their private
consumption patterns.
Allocating the MPP to industry at no charge may be seen
as society surrendering its rights in the common property
resource. To the extent there is a separate sense of the collective,
the fact that individuals are in the same position will not meet
this concern. The fact that there was collective input into the
organization of the scheme will not prevent this problem. It
is this perception that polluters should pay society that is
important.
If the idea of a separation of public and private roles is
rejected it is quite possible to object that this is just a fiction.
While not wanting to debate whether there is in fact a sense
of collectivity (as opposed to society being the mere sum of
49. B. Akerman, D. Elliot, Air Pollution Rights (1982-83), Yale Law Report.

50. Supra, note 29, at 127.
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individuals) I would argue that fictions are important. It has
been argued that all our legal theories are fictions representing
5
value choices. '
To the extent one views pollution as undesirable then it
would not be desirable to give industry a valuable asset for
doing something regarded as undesirable. This is a development
on the preference shaping argument that creating a right to
pollute in the first place tends to legitimize pollution. Giving
that right away for nothing would reinforce this by society
apparently attaching so low a value to this right.
This would be so even though a polluter may not emit any
more pollution than under the command control model for
free. In that model though, there is a clear impression that
society is in charge and polluters must tow the line (again it
is impression that counts here). What weight is placed on this
argument depends on what value people place on maintaining
the stigma attached to pollution. I think it is valuable. I do
not think all polluters are evil despoilers of the environment
or that all pollution can or should be eliminated. I do think
there is too much pollution now and fear that a legitimization
of pollution may lead to acquiescence in efforts to improve
the environment.
The force of these arguments decreases in considering the
United States' banking provisions. There, because the credit
is only given for exceeding the required cut backs, the values
of the command and control model are clearly visible. One
could view it as society not giving away anything because the
set up clearly indicates these cutbacks are more than what
society originally required.
Even after deciding who to allocate the permits to there are
many practical problems to overcome. In attempting to design
an MPP scheme for chlorofluorocarbons the organizers found
that they had vastly overestimated their ability to educate
people as to the rational of the scheme. 52 This is economic
language for the assumption that if people only understood
they would agree with you because the answer is so obvious.

51. R. Samek, Fictions and the Law (1981),31 U. of Toronto L. J. at 290.
52. M. Shapiro, E. Wachet, Marketable Permits: The Case of Chlorofluorocarbons (1983), 23 Nat. Resources J. at 591.
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These organizers found that even after deciding to allocate
the permits free of charge the decision of which polluters
(manufacturers, first line users, end of line users) to issue the
53
permits to was one of their most difficult tasks.
They also found that another thing economists tend to
ignore, short run transitional effects, posed large problems in
trying to arrange an implementation plan. 54 Any decision to
sell the permits would clearly favour the firms in a stronger
financial position at the time. An economist is not too
concerned if a few firms go bankrupt because he assumes full
employment and mobile capital and labour. In current
economic conditions the assumption of available alternate
employment is often not tenable. Besides the possibility of
political pressure there are legitimate theoretical grounds for
objection.
Another argument not often considered is the 'second best'
argument. When these MPP schemes are considered they are
often done on a narrow basis ie. chlorofluorocarbons. If they
place higher costs on that industry than others, by selling
permits for example, it will result in sectors prices increasing
artificially in realtion to other sectors with other less strict
pollution control. This change will distort the resource allocation
by causing an overly large contraction of that sector. It is also
interesting to note that all of these problems developed with
a substance which due to its nongeographic impact was very
well suited to an MPP approach.
A brief note should also be made of the fact that as the
advanced economies opt for more pollution control and less
growth the pressures for income redistribution both nationally
and internationally will grow. It will no longer be possible to
point to a growing pie in efforts to defer redistribution claims.
In summary I think the organizers of chlorofluorocarbon
MPP schemes are correct in their conclusion that it is the things
economists pay the least attention to that create problems in
attempting to implement an MPP scheme. 55 On the
administrative side there are large problems in designing the
permits and markets as well as in the monitoring and
53. Id. at 590.
54. Id.

55. Id.
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enforcement. On the political side the allocation question and
possible short term dislocations are capable of generating a
lot of pressure. Added to this is the preference for a tried and
true methodology. All these factors lead me to conclude that
MPP proposals have little practical appeal. 1 think that the
emergence of toxic chemical problems into the forefront of
environmental concerns will also lessen interest in MPP
schemes. I think their big benefit is sponsoring a search for
more cost effective ways to employ the traditional command
and control model. While the efforts in the United States show
such developments are not without problems they also show
that substanial cost savings are possible. More importantly
these developments demonstrate that it is not necessary to
dismantle the command and control model to employ cost
effectiveness arguments.
V. Conclusion
There are sound theoretical reasons to believe that a MPP
scheme would achieve the same level of pollution control as
the traditional command and control regulatory model at a
much lower cost. This result would be achieved by creating
a market in pollution which would allow individualized
responses by producers. The profit motive would result in
abatement effort being directed at the sources which could most
easily be cleaned up rather than demanding that all producers
meet one standard regardless of individualized cost
differences. 56 Due to the values incorporated in economic
analysis and the technical difficulties of establishing the scheme
I have concluded that the theoretical promise of a MPP scheme,
at most, translates into possibility of subsidiary relationship
with the current command and control model.
The values that lead people to advocate environmental
protection are often not in accord with the implicit values of
economic theory. 57 Any attempt to set the level of permits on
efficiency or cost benefit criteria assumes that the environment
is something that derives its value solely from the use people
make of it. It also assumes that there is some hypothetical
market where it is possible to price all the effects of pollution.
56. See infra, at 12-21.
57. See infra, at 2-12.
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This market is very difficult to imagine given the complex and
diverse effects of pollution, especially given the fact that there
is no where near the perfect information necessary to
contemplate this result. The very concept of profit
maximization is in itself value loaded. The assumption that
a price can fully represent the value placed on the environment
is difficult to maintain in the absence of rational maximizers
58
with perfect information.
To the degree that the level of permits is set on criteria other
than efficiency and cost benefit concerns some of the above
problems are of less importance. Nonetheless the concerns over
the effect of explicitly pricing pollution in the market remain
to the extent that the very act of pricing changes the way the
environment is viewed. 59 These concerns are accentuated if the
permits are distributed free to current producers. This type of
distribution says either that the producers always had a right
to pollute or that while people have a right to a clean
environment a certain amount will be given away for free. I
believe these type of arguments from the basis for the
opposition of environmentalists on license to pollute grounds.
Adopting a MPP scheme poses dangers to many
environmentalists because it incorporates values antithetical to
those sought to be reinforced. The existence of preference
shaping strengthens this concern, but also poses a harsh
dilemma. 60 If economic tools are rejected because of these
concerns there exists the risk that the environment will
deteriorate to a greater degree because of the ineffectiveness
of the current approach. This result would shape people's
conception of what clean is and may lead to a decrease in the
level of protection obtained, exactly the opposite result that
environmentalists wish to achieve. In short they are caught
between a rock and a hard place.
There are a great number of technical problems which
61
It
likewise impede the implementation of a MPP scheme.
would be difficult to structure a market with a sufficient level
of transactions to operate effectively. There are problems in
determining the tradability of different pollutants, of avoiding
58. See infra, at 5-9.

59. See infra, at 8-10.
60. See infra, at 12.

61. See infra, at 21-30.
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harmful local concentrations, and of appropriate geographic
delimitation. The monitoring and enforcement as well as the
market infrastructure may impose significant costs. The
allocation of the permits is probably the most difficult practical
problem. 62 To give them to current producers not only raises
objections from environmentalists and potential producers but
also from actual producers as no one method can satisfy all
producers. It would also create an additional barrier to new
entry in the market. To sell the permits would raise stiff industry
opposition to the short term dislocations caused by increased
63
costs to them.
In a short while it is true that potential savings to society
from the implementation of such a scheme are great, the values
implicit in it as well as the technical difficulties in applying
the theory will as a practical matter limit its impact to a
subsidiary role. In that role it ought to be possible to obtain
significant cost savings by sensitizing the regulatory system
without raising all of the concerns of a full scale conversion.
This conclusion undoubtedly reflects a particular value
choice that the possible savings of a full scale MPP scheme
are not worth its costs. it also reflects an assessment of the
likelihood of the political process implementing a scheme which
while saving money in total greatly redistributes the incidents
of costs and benefits. It is important to realize that any decision
on this matter represents a particular philosophical position.
Any attempt to deal with this matter must take account of
this conflict. While others may have different opinions on the
usefulness of MPP schemes unless the basic conflict of values
is openly addressed any decision made on the issue will be
necessarily incomplete.

62. See infra, at 27-28.
63. See infra, at 28-29.

